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Introduction 
The basic numbers on wage and productivity growth in the current business cycle 
tell a striking story.  In the five and one quarter years from the peak of the last cycle 
in the first quarter of 2001 to the second quarter of 2006, productivity increased by 
an impressive 17.9 percent, an average growth rate of 3.2 percent per year.1  By 
contrast, real wages have barely moved over this period, with the average hourly 
wage for production and nonsupervisory workers increasing by just 1.2 percent, an 
average annual growth rate of just over 0.2 percent.   
This extraordinary gap between wage and productivity growth demands an 
explanation.  The simplest and most obvious explanation is that there has been 
redistribution from wages to capital income (primarily profits plus interest).  While 
this is in partly true, the story is a bit more complicated.  To date, it appears that the 
redistribution from wages to capital income is typical for the early stages of a 
business cycle and does not suggest a structural break with the patterns from past 
cycles.  The current cycle may not have yet reached its profit peak, but unless the 
capital income share continues to grow, the peak share of capital income in the 
current cycle will be no larger than the peak share in the nineties cycle. 
A second major cause of the gap between wage growth and productivity growth is 
the fact that productivity is measured against gross output, while income must come 
from net output ― no one can eat depreciation.  There has been a substantial 
increase in the gap between gross and net output in recent years, as the share of 
GDP going to replace worn out and obsolete equipment has increased.  As a result, 
the rate of growth of “usable productivity” is considerably slower than the 
productivity growth numbers reported by the Labor Department.  When these 
factors are taken into account, the missing wage growth is considerably less of a 
mystery. 
 
Dean Baker is a co-director at the Center for Economic and Policy Research.  Rozina Ali, Lynn Erskine, 
and Rebecca Ray helped with the editing and layout of this paper. 
 
                                                 
1 This refers to growth in the non-farm business sector.  
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Capital Shares Over the Business Cycle 
It has been widely reported that profits have increased at the expense of wages over the course of 
this business cycle.  Data from the Commerce Department show that the capital share of income in 
the corporate sector rose by 2.8 percentage points between 2000 and 2005, from 19.0 percent to 
21.8 percent.  This reduced the labor share from 81.0 percent to 78.2 percent.2  This would appear 
to be a substantial shift from labor to capital income.  In fact the most recent data shows a shift of 
an additional percentage point with the capital share rising to 22.8 percent in the second quarter of 
2006.  As Table 1A shows, the capital income share was higher in 2005 than at any business cycle 
peak since 1969.  In fact, the capital income share for the second quarter actually matched the 1969 
share. 
TABLE 1A 
Capital Income Shares at Business Cycle Peaks 
 1959 1969 1979 1989 2000 2005 2006:2 
Labor Compensation 76.9% 77.2% 81.3% 80.0% 81.0% 78.2% 77.2% 
Capital Income 23.1% 22.8% 18.7% 20.0% 19.0% 21.8% 22.8% 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, Table 1.14. 
However, this picture is somewhat misleading.  The capital income share in national income typically 
reaches its peak before the business cycle peak.3  Therefore, it is misleading to compare capital 
income shares in 2005 or 2006 to shares at the business cycle peaks in prior decades.  It would be 
more appropriate to use the peak shares for capital income from prior cycles as the basis of 
comparison.  This is shown in Table 1B. 
TABLE 1B 
Capital Income Shares at Profit Peaks 
 1966 1977 1984 1997 2005 2006:2 
Labor Compensation 75.4% 81.6% 78.8% 77.8% 78.2% 77.2% 
Capital Income 24.6% 20.6% 21.2% 22.2% 21.8% 22.8% 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, Table 1.14. 
 
When compared to the profit peaks of prior cycles, it is not clear that there has been any 
redistribution from wages to capital income in the current decade.  The capital income share for 
2005 was still slightly lower than the year-round average for 1997.  While the capital income share 
for the most recent quarter is somewhat higher than for the full year, the capital income share 
peaked at 22.6 percent in the 3rd quarter of 1997, almost the same as the second quarter of 2006. 
                                                 
2  These calculations exclude the share of corporate income that goes to indirect taxes; the numbers are taken from 
NIPA table 1.14, lines 4 and 8.   
3  The capital income share generally peaks at the same time as the profit share since profits are by far the largest and 
most volatile component of capital income.   
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Furthermore, profit data is typically revised downward in the Commerce Department’s 
comprehensive revisions, largely due to the accounting of stock options. 4   
Of course, it is possible that we have not yet reached the profit peak of the current cycle and that 
the capital income share will grow further in future quarters, but with the economy weakening, this 
seems unlikely.  In any case, with the data we have on income shares to date, it does not appear that 
there has been any shift from wages to capital income in this cycle relative to the 1990s cycle.  Over 
the longer period from the 1970s to the present there has been a shift from wages to capital income, 
but this change took place between the 1970s and the 1990s, not in the current decade.  
Thus far in this cycle, the shift from labor income to capital income has been cyclical, not structural.  
If the cycle follows the same pattern as pervious post-war cycles, there should be a shift back 
towards labor income, which should allow wage growth to exceed the rate of productivity growth 
for a period of time. 
The Gap Between Productivity and “Usable Productivity”  
Typically, we expect wage growth to track productivity growth, assuming that the wage and capital 
shares of national income stay constant.  However, this is not possible if an increasing share of 
national income is devoted to depreciation.  No one can eat depreciation; this is output that must be 
set aside to replace worn out or obsolete capital.  In the fifties and sixties, there was little change in 
the depreciation share of output, so that the rate of growth of gross output and net output was 
almost the same.  
This has changed in the last quarter century as a larger share of investment has been in short-lived 
capital goods like computers and software that wear out or become obsolete quickly.  Figure 1 
shows the growth path of real gross and net output since 1959.  As can be seen, the growth paths 
have begun to diverge noticeably in recent years.  Over the course of the current business cycle, the 
gap between the growth rate of gross and net output has averaged 0.4 percentage points.  Even if 
there were no changes in distribution, there would be a gap of this size between the growth rate of 
productivity and the growth of wages. 
Another important factor leading to a substantial gap between productivity growth and wage growth 
in the current business cycle is simply the difference between the deflators used for productivity and 
wages.  The relevant deflator for productivity is the Implicit Price Deflator (IPD) for the output of 
the non-farm business sector.  The deflator conventionally used to measure wage growth is the 
Consumer Price Index.  These deflators differ both in the items they cover and in their 
methodology.  
The main difference in coverage stems from the fact that investment goods are an important 
component of the output of the non-farm business sector.  Since the price of investment goods (e.g. 
computers) has been falling rapidly relative to the price of other goods, the IPD for the non-farm 
business sector has risen less rapidly than the consumer price index.  The other reason for the gap 
between the rate of inflation shown by the two indices is that the Consumer Price Index is a fixed 
weight index and the IPD is chain-weighted – the weights of the items in the IPD change as the 
                                                 
4  The Commerce Department typically gets reported profits from corporations in which stock options are not treated as 
an expense. When it has fuller data the Commerce Department will deduct from reported profits the value of the 
options at the time they were issued.  
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composition of output changes.  Typically a chain-weighted index will show a lower rate of inflation 
than a fixed weight index. 5  
FIGURE 1 
The Growth of Gross and Net Output 
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, Table 1.14. 
 
Table 2 shows the extent to which the gaps between the growth of gross output and net output and 
the differences in deflators created gaps between the rate of productivity growth and the extent to 
which wages could have been expected to rise if distribution had remained constant.  As can be 
seen, both causes of this gap have grown substantially over the last half century.  In the current 
business cycle, their combined impact led to a difference of almost 0.9 percentage points between 
productivity growth and the rate at which real wages would have grown had distribution remained 
unchanged.  
TABLE 2 
Wage-Productivity Gap (Differences in Annual Growth Rates) 
 1959-69 1969-79 1979-89 1989-95 1995-2001:1 2001:1-06:2 
GDP-NDP  0.01 0.13 0.16 0.21 0.24 0.55 
CPI-RS minus adjusted IPD 0.13 0.24 0.46 0.38 0.78 0.33 
Total 0.14 0.37 0.62 0.59 1.03 0.88 
Productivity 2.71 1.88 1.40 1.59 2.36 3.19 
Usable Productivity 2.58 1.51 0.78 1.00 1.34 2.31 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics and author’s calculations.6 
                                                 
5 It is arguable that we should be using a chain-weighted index for consumption as well, but this discussion is simply 
attempting to identify the sources of the differences between the rate of productivity growth and real wage growth as 
conventionally measured.  
6  The gap between real GDP growth and the growth in real net national product is calculated based on the data in NIPA 
Table 1.7.6, lines 1 and 10. The CPI-RS is constructed from CPI-U-X-1 for years prior to 1978 and the CPI-U-RS for 
subsequent years, found in The Economic Report of the President, 2006, Table b-62. The implicit price deflator (IPD) for 
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There are two important points worth noting about Table 2.  The first is that the missing wage 
growth in the current cycle is far less than would be suggested by simply looking at productivity 
growth.  The “usable productivity” figure is the distribution-neutral number that we should focus 
on, not the straight productivity growth figure. 
The other point is that the history of the productivity downturn in the seventies and subsequent 
upturn in the nineties looks considerably different if we focus on “usable productivity.”  The falloff 
from the early post-war “golden age” productivity growth rates is considerably larger with the usable 
productivity measure, reaching 1.8 percentage points when the 1960s rate of productivity growth is 
compared with the 1980s rate.  The upturn in mid-nineties, while impressive, has still left the growth 
rate of usable productivity far below the growth rate of the golden age.  Since the mid nineties 
upturn, the growth rate in usable productivity is still almost a full percentage point slower than the 
growth rate in the sixties.  While the growth rate for usable productivity in the current cycle appears 
higher than in the late nineties, the business cycle is not yet complete and there are likely to be 
revisions that will push the growth rate downward.7  
This means that even with the IT revolution, the economy still does not possess the capacity to raise 
living standards at the same rate as it did in the early post-war period.  While there are some 
important measurement issues involved in this debate, the basic points are straightforward.  Insofar 
as a growing portion of output must be used to replace depreciated capital, a smaller share of output 
growth can go to raising living standards.  And the declining price or improving quality of capital 
goods only benefits consumers insofar as it eventually leads to more output of consumption goods 
and services. 
Will Workers Ever Benefit from Higher Productivity? 
This brief discussion addresses two points concerning the gap between productivity growth and 
wage growth in this business cycle.  First, it shows that the redistribution from labor to capital that 
has taken place thus far in this business cycle is in fact typical for the early part of a business cycle.  
If past patterns hold, then there should be redistribution in the opposite direction in coming 
quarters.  This redistribution has been an important factor holding down wage growth, but so far it 
appears to be cyclical in nature, not to represent a structural break with the pattern of distribution in 
the last cycle.  The second point is that there is actually less productivity growth to be distributed 
than is generally recognized.  When assessing real wage growth, the appropriate base of comparison 
should be the rate of growth of “usable productivity,” not the reported rate of productivity growth. 
Of course, this is not the whole story.  There has been a shift from wage to non-wage compensation 
over the course of the current cycle, primarily due to the rapid rate of increase in the cost of 
employer-provided health insurance.  The non-wage share of compensation has risen by 2.4 
percentage points from 16.9 percent in the 3rd quarter of 2001 to 19.3 percent in the 3rd quarter of 
2006.  If the non-wage share had stayed constant, this would have allowed for 2.9 percent growth in 
the average wage over this period. 
                                                                                                                                                             
the non-farm business sector was taken from the “Get Detailed Statistics” section of the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
website. The gap between the NDP deflator and the GDP deflator (NIPA Table 1.7.4, lines 10 and 1) was added to 
the IPD in order to avoid counting the price movements of depreciated investment goods.   
7  The Bureau of Labor Statistics has reported a preliminary estimate of its 2006 benchmark revision that would add 
810,000 jobs to the establishment survey. This revision will increase reported hours growth and lower productivity 
growth over the last year by approximately 0.6 percentage points.  
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Finally, there has been redistribution among wage earners, from those at the middle and the bottom 
to those at the top.  Wages for workers at the 90th and 95th percentile have risen at a healthy pace 
throughout this cycle and it is likely that wage growth has been even more rapid for workers higher 
in the wage distribution.8  The evidence suggests that it is not so much the owners of capital who are 
profiting at workers’ expense in this cycle (at least compared to the last one), but rather the workers 
at the top end of the wage distribution.  Through luck or favorable policy, they have managed to be 
the big gainers in the current business cycle.  
 
                                                 
8  See Mishel, L., J. Bernstein, and S. Allegretto, 2006. The State of Working America, 2006-2007, Table 3.4. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press.   
